I argue that Kant’s theory of international justice has been traditionally misunderstood. On the standard view, Kant claims that there exists a normative difference between (a) relations between individuals in a state of nature and (b) relations between nation-states on the international level such that nation-states, unlike individuals, are not required to enter into civil society but can instead settle for a mere “pacific federation of nations”. This reading is mistaken. In fact, Kant argues that nation-states, just like individuals, are normatively obligated to establish an international civil society between themselves. Nevertheless, because this goal cannot be at persent pragmatically realized, Kant advocates a “non-ideal” solution in terms of permissive law ala the merely “negative surrogate” of a pacific federation of nations – a distinctive Kantian approach to “non-ideal theory” that differs in some interesting ways from recent views developed by Rawls, Korsgaard, Murphy, and others.