In contrast to the three standard readings of the “contradiction” involved in Kant’s Categorical Imperative – the Logical Contradiction Interpretation [LCI] where our immoral maxim makes some practice like false promising impossible insofar as it no longer exists, the Practical Contradiction Interpretation [PCI] where we will some kind of self-defeating activity, and the Teleological Contradiction Interpretation [TCI] where our willing contradicts certain ends of nature itself – I defend a new version of LCI where the main contradiction involves the attribution of two logically contradictory predicates to our immoral maxim itself: namely, that it is and is not a universal law of nature at the same time. I show how this view not only conforms with Kant’s most detailed account of the idea of “contradiction” as found in the 1st Critique, but also offers us a more plausible reading of Kant’s discussion of both the Hypothetical and Categorical Imperative in the Groundwork.