On the traditional view, Butler regards forgiveness as the forswearing of resentment. I argue that this “Forswearal Reading” is mistaken. Instead, I defend a “Virtue Reading” according to which Butler asserts that forgiveness does not involve the abandoning or letting go of resentment, but rather simply being resentful in the right kind of way where we must avoid the extremes of (a) too much resentment or what Butler terms ‘malice’ or ‘revenge’ and (b) not being resentful enough where we fail to display what Butler sees as appropriate “self-love”. This new reading not only offers us an arguably superior account of forgiveness as a “virtue” than recent views like that defended by Roberts. It also helps to address traditional objections by Hampton, Murphy, Calhoun, Kolnai, Novitz, Richards, and others raised not only against Butler’s views in particular, but also the status of forgiveness as a praiseworthy response to moral wrongdoing more generally.